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A Qualified Privilege For Peer Review:
Physician, Reveal Thyself!
"If a privilege to suppress the truth is to be recognized at all, its limits
should be sharply determined so as to coincide with the limits of the benefits
it creates."'
Inherent in the concept of confidentiality is the danger that profes-
sionals will keep secrets to protect themselves rather than patients and
clients.2 Wrongdoings of professionals are obscured from view to avoid
exposure of questionable and often dangerous practices.3 Confiden-
tiality can be used as a shield to prevent outsiders, often prospective
plaintiffs, from discovering negligence, overcharging, unnecessary
surgery or institutionalization.4 For example, professionals invoke con-
fidentiality shields to protect incompetent colleagues' negligence in
hospitals as well as in non-medical industries.5
1. Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Preface to the American Law Institute's Model Code
of Evidence at 7, (1942), reprinted in Cronin v. Strayer, 467 N.E.2d 143,148 (1984).
2. See S. BoK, SEcRETs 131-135 (1982) (hereinafter referred to as SECRETs). Traditional
professionals invoking confidentiality privileges include doctors, lawyers, and priests. Id. at
116. Accountants, bankers, social workers, and growing numbers of professionals now invoke
a similar duty to guard confidences. Id. While a number of professional groups invoke con-
fidentiality, the law recognizes the privilege only in limited circumstances. Confidentiality refers
to the boundaries surrounding shared secrets and the duty to protect confidences under certain
circumstances. Id. at 119. In practice, "confidentiality may even be stretched so far as to in-
clude what professionals hide from patients, clients, and the public at large." Id. at 133. S.
BoK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN Puauc AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978) (hereinafter referred to as LYING).
Colleagues are usually the first to know when one of their peers places patients at risk. Id.
at 153-156. Hiding the truth to avoid exposure is a health risk to society. Professional loyalty
is clearly outweighed by the duty to prevent grievous harm to patients. Id.
There can be no excuse for lying to protect anyone who places patients at such risk.
And only an overwhelming blindness to the suffering of those beyond one's immediate
sphere can lead colleagues simply to oust an incompetent and dangerous surgeon
from their own hospital so quietly that he can continue his 'work' at another.
Id. at 155. The duty to keep secrets is enforced by many codes of professional ethics and
the responsibility is often placed upon workers in private industry and government. Report
from the Center for Philosophy & Public Policy, To Tell or Not to Tell: Conflicts about Con-
fidentiality UNIVERSITY OF MD. Vol. 4 No. 2 Spring 1984 (discussing the balancing of the duty
of confidentiality against the grave harm that can come from keeping secrets).
3. Bok, Secrets, supra note 2, at 133.
4. Id.
5. Id. See Boston Sunday Globe, Aug. 24, 1975, editorial reprinted in BOK, LYING, SUPRA
note 2, at 155.
_ , a Sacramento, California orthopedist has millions of dollars in malpractice
judgments against him, has admitted under oath that he performed complicated and
dangerous spinal surgery when it was unnecessary, and still has numerous suits pend-
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Recently, the privilege invoked in these settings has become known
as the "privilege of self-critical analysis. ' 6 The privilege of self-critical
analysis shields certain institutional self-analysis from discovery.' Ob-
jective commentators consider the privilege detrimental to the ad-
ministration of justice and unwarranted by demands of public policy.8
Confidentiality privileges continue to exist because of public pressure
from influential organizations concerned about self-interests rather than
public interest. 9
Statutes and court decisions have continued to recognize confiden-
tiality privileges.' 0 Generally, courts emphasize that confidentiality is
essential to the free flow of information which is necessary to pro-
mote important public interests." The California Legislature has
enacted several self-critical analysis privileges based upon
confidentiality." One controversial privilege is the privilege that shields
hospital committee proceedings and records from discovery. 3
ing against him involving patients left crippled or paralyzed. Several news reports
confirm that colleagues lied for him, intervened at the operating table to keep him
from botching delicate procedures, and, on occasion, performed follow-up opera-
tions to repair damage he caused, all without taking any action to restrict his further
practice. When at long last his colleagues voted to restrict his hospital privileges,
they did it so quietly that he simply continued to work at another hospital in the
same town.
Id. at 155.
6. Comment, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 1087.91
(1983). The three primary types of documents to which the privilege is applied are minutes
of hospital committee meetings, disciplinary investigations, and title VII compliance forms. Id.
at 1090. For the purposes of this comment, the privilege of self-critical analysis is used inter-
changeably with the "peer review privilege" and the "confidentiality privilege." This comment
focuses on the application of the privilege as it applies to hospital peer review committee meetings.
7. Id. at 1083.
8. 3 JONES ON EVIDENCE §21:43 (Gard. ed. 1972), reprinted in L. DUNN, CRITICAL ISSUES
IN HEALTH CARE, at 64 (1978).
9. Id; see HOSPITAL LIABILITY, LAW AND TACTICS 288 (M. Bertolet & L. Goldsmith ed.
1980).
10. Comment, supra note 6, at 1087; see infra notes 170-286 and accompanying text.
11. Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd 479 F.2d 920
(D.C. Cir. 1973). The Court in Bredice put forth this classic statement in protecting the minutes
of a hospital committee meeting in which doctors were asked their opinions of hospital pro-
cedures. Id. at 251.
12. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040 (government confidentiality privilege); see infra
notes 234-59 and accompanying text; CAL. EVID. CODE §1060 (trade secret privilege); infra notes
260-286 and accompanying text. See also, F. Haight & J. Cotchett, California Courtroom
Evidence, at 303, 312 (2d ed. 1981, revised 1985); 8 J. WIGMORE, WIOMORE ON EVIDENCE,
527-37 (McNaughten, 1961) (confidential communications in general, sundry privileges).
13. Letter to Senator Torres from the California Trial Lawyers Association (May 16, 1985)
(discussing the Association's opposition to SB 439 which was introduced by Senator Torres;
"The discovery privilege is not without controversy") (on file at Pacific Law Journal). See
also California Legislature Senate Committee on Judiciary, Senator B.D. Keene, Interim Hear-
ing on Utilization Review, Sept. 12, 1984 (on file at Pacific Law Journal).
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Hospital peer review committee records have been protected from
public scrutiny by either statute or court decision since their incep-
tion. As a protection against legal scrutiny of records, the peer review
privilege in California was enacted in 1968 and set forth in Califor-
nia Evidence Code section 1157. " California Evidence Code section
1157 is based upon the theory that external access to peer review pro-
ceedings and records of medical staff committees inhibits effective
14. CAL. Evm. CODE §1157 states in pertinent part:
Neither the proceedings nor the records of organized committees . . . having the
responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the quality of care rendered in the
hospital ... shall be subject to discovery. Except as hereinafter provided, no person
in attendence at a meeting of any such committee shall be required to testify as to
what transpired thereat. The prohibition relating to discovery or testimony shall not
apply to the statements made by any person in attendance at such meeting who is
a party to an action or proceeding the subject of which was reviewed at such meeting,
or to any person requesting hospital staff privileges, or in any action against an in-
surance carrier alleging bad faith . . . . The prohibitions contained in this section
shall not apply to . . . society committees that exceed 10% of the membership of
the society, nor to any such committee if their own conduct is being reviewed. This
section shall not exclude relevant evidence in a criminal action.
Id. See Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 319-322
(1974). In California, a patient suffered injuries resulting from negligent treatment by the doc-
tor and from the hospital's negligence in retaining doctor and staff without inquiry into or
control over the doctors competence. Hospital administrative files could be discovered, but
pursuant to CAL. EvD. CODE §1157, the files of the various peer review committees could
not be discovered. Id; Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital v. Superior Court, 81 Cal.
App. 3d 626, 634-636, 146 Cal. Rptr. 542, 547-548 (1978) (transcript of peer review committee
staff hearings were immune from discovery under CAL. EvID. CODE §1157, and hospital had
not waived the privilege by voluntarily filing the transcript in administrative mandamus pro-
ceedings); Snell v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 44, 50-52, 204 Cal. Rptr. 200, 204 (1984)
(in alleging negligent retention of staff physicians, records of staff committee were absolutely
immune from discovery, and information as to whether hospital required staff physicians to
obtain malpractice insurance was irrelevent and not discoverable); Mt. Diablo v. Pope, 158
Cal. App. 3d 344, 347-348, 204 Cal. Rptr. 626, 627-628 (1984) (hospital not required to pro-
vide answers which could not be given without divulging "proceedings or records" of medical
staff committees); but see Brown v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 489, 502-504,
Cal. Rptr. - (1985). The trial court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff discovery of whether
the hospital had evaluated negligent physician, since the request did not include the demand
for any "proceedings or records" connected to such evaluation. In addition, the trial court
erred in denying discovery regarding hospital requirements of medical malpractice insurance
coverage since the coverage information is relevant in any suit based upon hospital's negligence
in screening and evaluating a physician). Id.
Segal v. Roberts, 380 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (1979) (held discovery of proceedings and records
of a medical society committee examining alleged negligence of a physician should be allowed
only in the most necessary circumstances), cert. den. 388 So. 2d 1117 (1980); Dade County
Medical Association v. Hlis 372 So. 2d 117, 121 (1979)(the interests of the public in maintain-
ing confidentiality of records sought greatly outweighed the grounds for discovery asserted by
defendant in auto accident case); Wesley Medical Center v. Clark, 669 P.2d 209, 215- 220
(1983) (Kansas has no absolute privilege for medical staff committee meeting minutes, and
when such documents are sought, a balancing test should be applied); Nazareth Literary &
Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W. 2d 177, 179 (1973) (internal records of hospital staff
committee were discoverable over hospital's claims that they should be regarded as privileged
matter and remain confidential because of considerations of public policy).
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physician participation in peer review activities.'" The rationale for
providing confidentiality for records and proceedings is that other-
wise physicians would be inhibited from free discussion during self-
analysis meetings; these meetings are vital to the continued improve-
ment in the medical care of patients.'" Discovery of hospital peer review
proceedings is denied under section 1157 for malpractice actions against
a hospital for corporate hospital negligence. 7
In 1982, a California Court of Appeal in Elam v. College Park
Hospital" adopted the doctrine of corporate hospital negligence. The
doctrine provides that a hospital may be held liable to a patient for
the negligent conduct of independent physicians and surgeons.' 9 The
Court in Elam found that a hospital owes a legal duty to exercise
reasonable care in selecting and reviewing staff physicians.20 Failure
to use reasonable care creates an unreasonable risk of harm to patients
in the hospital facility.' To defend against a charge of corporate
hospital negligence, the hospital must demonstrate reasonable care was
taken in the selection of physicians allowed to use hospital facilities."
The level of care is shown by proof of review committee effectiveness.23
The plaintiff will then attempt to demonstrate review committee inef-
fectiveness. Records and testimony of committee members are rele-
vant, if not indispensable, sources of information regarding whether
the hospital properly reviewed the peer review proceedings.24 However,
California Evidence Code section 1157 prevents the discovery of peer
review reports by patient litigants." Lack of discovery of peer review
15. Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320; see infra notes 45-69 and
accompanying text.
16. Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 320; see infra notes 120-136
and accompanying text.
17. CAL. Evm. CODE §1157; see supra note 14 and accompanying text; see infra notes
137-158 and accompanying text.
18. 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982), modified 133 Cal. App. 3d 94(a) (1982).
19. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d. at 346-347, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 157-158. Independent refers
to physicians who are neither employees nor agents of the hospital. Id. at 336, 183 Cal. Rptr.
at 159. Prior to Elam, corporate hospital negligence had not been recognized in any published
decision in California. See, eg., Gonzales v.Nork, Civil No. 228566 (Super. Ct. Sacramento
County Cal.,1973) (unpublished opinion asserting that hospital owes duty to monitor quality
assurance committee functions), rev'd, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 31 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd,
20 Cal. 3d 500, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240, 573 P.2d 458 (1978).
20. Id. at 341, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 346, 183 Cal. Rptr. 164.
23. Id.
24. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
25. CAL. EVID. CODE §1157. Patient litigant refers to patients as litigants bringing an action
under corporate hospital negligence. Patient litigants are distinguished from physician
litigants who are not precluded from pretrial discovery of peer review committee proceedings
due to the exception in CAL. Evw. CODE §1157. See A. B. Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege:
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reports in reality denies plaintiffs the opportunity to prove the evidence
necessary to effectively undertake a corporate negligence action against
the hospital for injury or death.2" Furthermore, the absolute privilege
granted peer review proceedings is unnecessary in light of other pro-
tections physicians receive under immunity statutes. 7 Under current
law, a hospital may escape liability for culpable acts due to a pa-
tient's inability to obtain evidence necessary to bring a cause of
action." California law should be amended to bar application of the
privilege when the potentially privileged information is necessary to
ensure the proper administration of justice. 9
This comment proposes that the California Legislature amend the
absolute protection of Evidence Code section 1157 in favor of a
A Law in Search of a Valid Policy, AM. J. L. MED. Vol. 10, No. 2, 151 (1984). The paradox
created by the exception is illustrated in this article. The peer review privilege cannot promote
confidentiality since the exception under CAL. EvrD. CODE §1157 allows physician plaintiffs
to obtain the records when seeking judicial review of proceedings leading to their exclusion
or dismissal from hospital medical staffs. Id. at 155-156. See Shulz v. Superior Court, 66 Cal.
App. 3d 440, 446-47, 136 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70-71 (1977); West Covina v. Superior Court, 153
Cal. App. 3d 134, 200 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984), reh'g denied, 165 Cal. App. 3d 794, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 677 (1985) (issue as to whether a physician may waive the peer review privilege and testify
as to what transpired at the peer review committee meetings). See also Ott v. St. Luke Hospital
of Campbell County, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 706 (1981) (plaintiff physician sought discovery of
peer review committee proceedings when denied staff privileges at defendant hospital).
26. See infra notes 142-169 and accompanying text.
27. D. deVires, Medical Staff Peer Review Proceedings and Records Should Be Discoverable
Following Adoption of Corporate Hospital Negligence in California, 12 C. T.L.A. Forum 230, 237
(1982). "It is debatable that arming hospital medical staffs with absolute privilege in addition to
absolute immunity fosters effective peer review." Id. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 43.7, 43.8, 47 (physi-
cian immunity statutes in California). See generally L. & Dunn, Critical Issues in Health Care,
36-37 (1978) (description of California immunity statutes protecting medical staff members from
liability). As of 1975, at least thirty-two states had enacted statutes that provide either absolute
or qualified immunity to physicians who participate in medical staff peer review committees. These
states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusettes, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyom-
ing. Id. at 7. The scope of immunity statutes varies and, therefore, each must be consulted individ-
ually. Hall & Hyg, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal Status, 1 AM.
J. L. MED. 245, 262 n.53. (1975). See also Langhenry, Immunity of In-Hospital Committee
Members and Confidentially of Staff Committee Records, 24 FEDERATION INSURANCE COUNSEL,
SUM~MER QUARTERLY, 3-13 (1975) (exploring the personal immunity from civil damages of in-
hospital staff committee members, and the legal right to withhold committee communications
and records from evidence and pretrial discovery); Gregory, Immunity For Physicians in Peer
Review Committees, 31 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 193-202, (1984) (overview of immunity given
to participants in hospital peer review committees).
28. Cuneo, Disclosure v. Confidentiality of Hospital Peer Review Committee Records, 31 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 172 (1984). The "wall" around minutes, documents and reports is unwarranted
because of immunity statutes. The author notes that "bad physicians sometimes even get away
with murder." Id. 172; see R. H. Hirsh, Sanctity of Hospital Peer Review Committee Records
Crumbling, 31 MED. TRIAL TECH. 0. 184-192 (1984); see infra notes 298-311 and accompany-
ing text.
29. See infra notes 287-290 and accompanying text.
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qualified privilege. 30 The qualified privilege is in harmony with the
law of the majority of states in which the privilege of self-critical
analysis exists. 3' In the majority of states, the privilege is applied on
a case by case basis.3 2 Statutes and decisions have indicated that the
privilege can be overcome by a showing of exceptional need by the
party seeking discovery.3 3 This comment will examine Evidence Code
section 1157 and the underlying policies of the section. 4 This com-
ment then will discuss the doctrine of corporate hospital negligence."
The competing interests of the plaintiff and hospital in the context
of a civil proceeding will be examined to demonstrate a need for
discovery of peer review committee proceedings and records.36
Analogies to the psychotherapist-patient privilege,37 the official infor-
mation privilege,38 and the trade secret privilege39 will demonstrate
that a qualified privilege for discovery would be the most effective
method to assure the proper administration of justice.4" This com-
ment will propose legislative amendment of Evidence Code section
1157. 4 ' This amendment would provide that the privilege be withheld
to allow patients access to peer review records if the plaintiff makes
a showing of extraordinary need. 42 To understand the need for
statutory amendment, an examination of Evidence Code section 1157
and judicial interpretation of the section is necessary.
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1157
Medical staff committees have the responsibility of evaluating and
improving the quality of care rendered in hospitals. 3 California
Evidence Code section 1157 provides that proceedings and records
of organized medical staff committees are not subject to discovery.44
Furthermore, no person in attendance at any medical staff review com-
30. Id.
31. Comment, supra note 6, at 1096; see infra notes 170-188 and accompanying text.
32. Comment, supra note 6, at 1096-1097.
33. Id. at 1097.
34. See infra notes 43-95 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 96-141 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 142-169 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 189-233 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 234-259 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 260-286 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 170-259 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 287-290 and accompanying text.
42. Id.
43. See supra notes 46-70 and acompanying text.
44. CAL. EVID. CODE §1157.
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mittee meeting can be required to testify regarding the events of the
meeting.45 To understand the scope of section 1157, the role of peer
review committees must be examined.
A. The Functions of Peer Review Committees
The establishment of peer review committees in hospitals was man-
dated by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
(hereinafter referred to as JCAH) and federal regulation." To ac-
quire accreditation from the JCAH, a hospital must demonstrate an
adequate method of assessment and control of the quality of patient
care.47 The acquisition of JCAH accreditation has been encouraged
by federal regulation since 1965.8 A hospital with JCAH accredita-
tion automatically qualifies for federal Medicare reimbursements. "9
In addition, Congress created Professional Standard Review Organiza-
tions in 1972 to act as peer review groups and to promote the best
delivery of health care.50 Hospitals are required to establish peer review
committees to receive accreditation from the JCAH. s' The peer review
45. Id.
46. See Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, Accreditation Manual for Hospitals,
Introduction at ix- xi (1983) (hereinafter referred to as JCAH Manual). The JCAH is an exten-
sion of the Hospital Standardization Program established by the American College of Surgeons
in 1918 to encourage adoption of a uniform medical records format that would accurately
describe the patient's clinical course. Id. at ix.
47. See id. at x (historical review of JCAH).
48. Id. See Comment, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52
TEsp. L. Q. 552, 563 (1979) (overview of the structure and course of medical peer review
protection, with historical review of JCAH); Cuneo, supra note 28, at 173 (briefly discussing
standards of JCAH).
49. See JCAH Manual, supra note 46, at ix. Congress amended the Social Security Act
in 1972 to create Professional Standard Review Organizations. Id. The provision that the hospitals
participating in Medicare were to maintain a standard of patient care was written into the
Medicare Act. Id. Hospitals accredited by JCAH were deemed to be in compliance with federal
requirements for participation in Medicare. Id.; Cuneo, supra note 28, at 173; Comment, supra
note 48, at 563.
50. Comment, supra note 48, at 563-564. See also Interim Hearings on Utilization Review,
1984: Hearings on Utilization Review Before Senate Committee on Judiciary (on file at Pacific
Law Journal)(statement of Robert McCray, Legal Counsel. of the California Hospital Associa-
tion). Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organizations, (PRO's) are being establish-
ed in each state to conduct utilization and quality review of hospital and health care activities
under the Medicare program. The California PRO will replace the existing Professional Stan-
dards Review Organizations (PSRO's) which have heretofore fulfilled these functions. See generally
Batavin, Preferred Provider Organizations: Antitrust Aspects and Implications for the Hospital
Industry 10 Ai.f. J. L. MED. 169, 175-187(1984) (the Preferred Provider Organization is a re-
cent development in the health care industry involving selection and contracting for health care
services); S. TIBBETTS & A. MANZAND, PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS: AN ExEcuTiVE
GUIDE (1984).
51. Comment, supra note 48, at 564 (accreditation differs from licensing, licensing con-
notes meeting the least of standards, while accrediting signifies positive achievements of high
standards).
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committees are responsible for monitoring and evaluating the quality
of care provided within the hospital. 2 Committees directly perform-
ing the reviews include the Credentials Committee, Medical Audit Com-
mittee, Tissue Committee, Utilization Committee and Executive
Committee.53
The role of the Credentials Committee is to screen applicants for
staff perquisites. 5 The Credentials Committee collects information con-
cerning a physician's competence and submits a recommendation to
the staff executive committee and hospital board." The Medical Audit
Committee, sometimes called the Quality Assurance Committee, com-
pares the quality of care in the hospital with the state of the art of
existing medical knowledge.5 6 The role of the Tissue Committee is
to supervise the quality of surgery. 7 Since direct review of surgery
is not practical, the medical audit is conducted by a review of the
patient's medical record.5"
The Utilization Committee was established in response to the Social
Security Amendment of 1965.1' The Amendment requires participating
hospitals to develop a utilization review plan. This plan must include
committees to oversee the conformance of the plan to the Medi-Cal
Act.6" The Utilization Committee reviews the propriety of admissions
to the hospital, length of stay, discharge procedures, and use of medical
and hospital services.6 '
The Executive Committee is composed of the chiefs of each hospital
department, officers of the medical staff, and members of the active
staff.62 The Executive Committee receives and evaluates all other com-
mittee reports and makes recommendations to the hospital board. 3
52. Id; see L. DUNN, supra note 27, at 54-60 (quality control maintained by hospital com-
mittee system).
53. L. DUNN, supra note 27, at 54-60; Comment, supra note 48, at 565. These committees
are representative of those most commonly found required by JCAH and federal regulation.
Id. at 565.
54. See Comment, supra note 48, at 564-565; L. DUNN, supra note 27, at 57; Hall &
Hyg, supra note 27 at 266.
55. deVries, supra note 27, at 231, 237.
56. Comment, supra note 48, at 564; L. DUNN, supra note 27 at 58.
57. L. DUNN, supra note 27, at 58.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See L. DUNN, supra note 27 at 59. The Federal Medical Act requires hospitals to
provide a "utilization review" plan of hospital facilities to ensure the implementation of utilization
review in accordance with federal law. Id. See 42 U.S.C. §1395 (1965) (Health Insurance for
Aged and Disabled).
61. See L. DUNN, supra note 27, at 59-60.
62. Id. at 57; Hall & Hyg, supra note 27, at 248.
63. L. DUNN, supra note 27, at 56.
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Recommendations are made regarding discipline of staff members,
extension or reduction of staff perquisites, and whether to grant or
deny admission to the medical staff."
The records of the Credentials Committee generally include files
for each applicant requesting staff perquisites. 65 Information regard-
ing professional competence and previous disciplinary actions may be
included in the files.66 The records of the other four committees are
similar. The files usually include minutes of peer review meetings and
correspondence to particular physicians from the committee." Thus,
records of peer review committees performing quality assurance func-
tions are indispensable sources of information for determining whether
the medical staff has performed competently.65 Discovery of the
records, however, is prohibited by section 1157 of the California
Evidence Code.6 9 The rationale for the prohibition is based upon public
policy considerations." °
B. Policy Considerations for the Enactment of Section 1157
Evidence Code section 1157 was enacted in direct response to Kenney
v. Superior Court.7' In Kenney, the plaintiff requested identification
of physicians participating in disciplinary committee proceedings. 72 The
disciplinary proceedings contained reports of physicians whose staff
perquisites had been terminated by the hospital. Most of plaintiff's
demands for pretrial discovery were permitted. The court in Kenney
was not concerned with the admissibility of disciplinary proceeding
reports. 74 The court reasoned that pretrial discovery only required that
the evidence be related to the subject matter of the action. 75 Even
64. Id.
65. Id. at 57.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 56-60.
68. V. Nelson, Corporate Hospital Liability; A Ship in Search of a Rudder, CTLA Forum
23rd Annual State Convention Syllabus Nov. 1984 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal);
Loveridge and Kimball, Hospital Corporate Negligence Comes to California: Questions in the
Wake of Elam v. College Park Hospital, 14 PAC. L.J. 803, 826 (1983).
69. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1157; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (statute reprinted
in part).
70. See infra notes 71-95 and accompanying text.
71. Kenney v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 106, 63 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1967). See, Loveridge
and Kimball, supra note 68, at 826-27 (Kenney promulgated CAL. EVID. CODE §1157); Matchett
v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1974).
72. See, Bernstein, Law in Brief, 45 HospITALs, J.A.H.A. 149-150 (1971) (discussion of
Kenney decision).
73. Id. at 149.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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if inadmissible, the court noted the evidence would be valuable to
the plaintiff if discovery would lead to properly admissible evidence.76
Powerful medical lobbying organizations considered the Kenney deci-
sion a threat to the effectiveness of peer review." As a result of public
pressure from these influential organizations, section 1157 was enacted
by the California Legislature one year after the Kenney decision."'
The first court decision to construe section 1157 was the California
Court of Appeal in Matchett v. Superior Court." Matchett involved
a malpractice action in which negligent treatment of a patient by a
doctor and a hospital was alleged." The plaintiff contended that the
doctor was granted staff perquisites without adequate inquiry into
or control over the doctor's competence. 8' The court denied plain-
tiff's request for pretrial discovery of hospital committee files." The
rationale cited in support of the denial was in essence the public policy
underlying the enactment of section 1157.83
The California Legislature's intent in passing section 1157 is best
expressed by the Matchett court. The court discerned that Evidence
Code section 1157 was enacted to serve a public interest in encourag-
ing frankness, candor and objectivity in staff committee
investigations. Consequently, the quality of in-hospital medical prac-
tice is enhanced by providing staff with a measure of confidentiality.5
Hence, the privilege is justified by the need for confidentiality in pro-
moting complete and candid peer review. 6
The purpose of the peer review privilege is to attain higher quality
health care within hospitals. 7 This goal is achieved by doctors
evaluating each other's professional competence based upon the
evaluator's own specialized expertise." Hospital committee confiden-
tiality is designed to encourage self-regulation of physician
76. Id. at 150.
77. Id.
78. See HOSPITAL LIABILITY, LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 9, at 288.
79. Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974).
80. Id. at 626, 115 Cal. Rptr. 318.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 631-32, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 321-22.
83. Id. at 628-29, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 319-320.
84. Id. at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320-321.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See JCAH, supra note 46, at 106. "The medical staff shall provide ... review, evaluation
and monitoring of medical staff practice and functions to maintain higher professional stan-
dards of care within the hospital." Id.
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competence.8 9 Specifically, the legislature recognized that, absent
statutory peer review privileges, physicians would be reluctant to sit
on peer review committees and engage in frank evaluations of their
colleagues. 90 In the absence of a statute, courts were reluctant to create
a peer review privilege. 9' Therefore, peer review proceedings have not
been subject to any significant "judicial surveillance." 92
Recently, courts and commentators have noted that self-regulatory
means of ensuring competence of physicians are deficient. 93 As a result,
the negligence and incompetence of staff physicians remain
undetected. 94 The doctrine of corporate hospital liability developed
in response to the failure of physician self-regulation to detect physi-
cian incompetence. 95
THE DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE HOSPITAL LIABILITY
The doctrine of corporate hospital liability developed because tradi-
tional regulatory means failed to detect and discipline incompetent
physicians. 96 The doctrine provides that a hospital is liable for breach
of a duty to ensure the competence of its medical staff through careful
selection and review. 97 An understanding of the reasons why regulatory
89. Note, Reallocating Liability to Medical Staff Review Committee Members: A Response
to the Hospital Corporate Liability Doctrine, 10 Am. J. L. & MED. 115 (1984).
90. Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
91. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir.
1981); Ott v. St. Luke Hospital of Campbell County, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 706 (1981); Wesley
Medical Center v. Clark, 234 Kan. 13 (1983); Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
75 Wis. 2d 190 (1977); Nazareth Library & Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d 177.
n.9 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
92. See Franko v. Dist. Court in and for City and Cty. of Denver, 641 P.2d 922, 927
(1982) (records shielded from discovery except in connection with judicial review proceeding).
93. See Note, supra note 89, at 115. Traditional regulatory mechanisms to police physi-
cian incompetence include self-regulation, state licensure, malpractice systems, and Professional
Standards Review Organizations. Id. Corporate hospital liability developed in response to the
failure of these regulatory mechanisms. Id. Courts should recognize a cause of action in
negligence against medical staff review committees. Id. at 115-117.
94. Id. at 117-120. See also, R. DERBYSmR, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE
UNITED STATES, 17-28 (1968). "One can find many instances of miscreants who have gone
unpunished because of failure of the board to follow the letter of the law." The "board"
refers to physicians who police themselves for disciplinary purposes. Id. at 17. California has
seen improvement in the safeguarding of citizens against incompetent physicians due to im-
provements in Medical Practice Act. Id. at 27.
95. Note, supra note 89, at 117; Note, Hospital Corporate Liability: An Effective Solu-
tion for Controlling Private Physician Incompetence, 32 RUTGERS L. R v. 342 (1979); Strodel,
The Impaired Physician-Hospital Corporate Liability, 24 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 488 (1981); Com-
ment, Hospital May Be Held Liable for Permitting Incompetent Independent Physicians to
Operate, 8 Rtrr.-CMi. L.J. 177 (1976).
96. Note, supra note 89, at 115.
97. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 347, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165. See Southwick, The Hospital
as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship with the Staff Physicians,
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mechanisms failed provides insight into the purpose behind corporate
hospital liability.
A. The Failings of Self-Regulation
Commentators perceive that self-regulation of physicians in the
medical field has been unsuccessful. 9 One primary reason is that the
most severe sanction available is expulsion. 99 Expulsion, however, has
no effect on the legal right of a physician to practice medicine in
another hospital.' Therefore, a possibility exists that a physician
dismissed from one hospital can practice at another.
In addition, self-regulatory mechanisms fail because of dependence
upon physicians to report the misconduct of their peers."' Physicians
do not have sufficient incentive to report the incompetence of their
peers and, consequently, reports of physician misconduct are rarely
filed. ' 2 Few states require physicians to report peer misconduct to
a disciplinary body.'0 3 Even fewer states designate failure by physi-
9 CAL. W. L. REV. 429, 443 (1973) (hospital corporate negligence as a new cause of action);
Comment, Hospital Corporate Negligence Comes to California: Questions in the Wake of Elam,
14 PAC. L.J. 803 (1983) (hereinafter cited as Elam Questions) (discussing the advent of cor-
porate hospital negligence in California with an exploration of issues raised by plaintiff and
hospital lawyers); Comment, The Hospital Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for
the Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. RaV. 385 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Hospital Physi-
cian Relationship) (responsibility of hospitals to monitor physicians practice within hospital
facilities); Slawkowski, Do the Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital Practices?, 22 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 452 (1978); A. Goldberg, The Duty of Hospitals and Hospital Medical Staffs
to Regulate the Quality of Patient Care: A Legal Perspective, 14 PAC. L.J. 55, 56 n.3
(1982) (hereinafter referred to as A Legal Perspective).
98. See Note, supra note 95 at 343-56.
99. See Brook, Brutoco and Williams, The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and
Quality of Care, 1975 DuxE L.J. 1197, 1215 (1975). State medical societies are not significantly
involved in physician discipline. I he actions taken against a physician for incompetence are
not public, and only rarely are the consequences severe. The author's propose that the "ultimate
punishment would be expulsion from the society." Id. at 1216; Note, supra note 89, at 118.
(quoting Quirin, Physician Licensing and Educational Obsolescence: A Medical Legal Dilemma
36 ALa. L. REv. 503, 510 (1972)).
100. Note, supra note 89, at 118. See F. GRAD & N. MARxn, PHYsiciAts LtCENSURE AND
DisCIPLrNE, 37-41 (1979). Medical societies are not under an obligation to report complaints
against a physician in which the society did not act. In 16 states, hospitals are required to
report a physician's loss of or limitation of privileges because of medical misconduct, but are
not required by law to keep records of disciplinary matters that patients, hospital employees,
or other physicians report. Id. at 37-38. Reporting the violations of state Medical Practice Acts
is designed to trigger disciplinary proceedings against physicians due to medical misconduct.
Id. at 37-38. In California, the definition of unprofessional conduct includes "gross negligence,
gross incompetence and gross immorality." R. DEntavsai, supra note 94, at 26.
101. See F. GRAD & N. M.An, supra note 100, at 37 (the author catalogues the various
methods used by different states to report violations of state Medical Practice Acts, and whether
individual states require reports of physician disciplinary actions).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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cians to report misconduct as unprofessional and subject to disciplinary
action.' 4 Physicians avoid reporting peer misconduct to protect one
another from expulsion from the medical society or loss of license.' 0
Additionally, doctors fear the label of "informer". 106 The result is
a phenomenon known as "conspiracy of silence."' 0 7 Thus, self-
regulation of physicians as a control for hospital incompetence is in-
effective. The doctrine of corporate hospital liability was developed
in response to this failure of individual self-regulation.
B. Corporate Negligence
The doctrine of corporate hospital negligence is recognized in other
jurisdictions in the United States.' Under the doctrine, a hospital
is accountable for negligently reviewing the competence of the medical
staff."0 9 This accountability ensures that adequate medical care is ad-
ministered to patients at the hospital facility." 0 The doctrine of cor-
porate hospital negligence was developed for two major reasons. The
first reason was the changing role of the hospital from a charitable
institution to a "business.""' The second reason was the hospital's
superior position to police physician incompetence." 2 The infamous
Nork case provided impetus for development of the doctrine." 3
104. Id. at 38-39. See Brook, Brutoco, and Williams, supra note 99, at 1215-16 (disciplinary
actions against physicians past and present).
105. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 100, at 38-39.
106. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, supra note 100, at 39. The widespread feeling that "informing"
is wrong would not be overcome by a mandatory reporting requirement because a physician's
failure to report another physician is not easy to prove. Id.
107. See Dunn, Peer Review: A Secret Affair?, 31 TRUSTEE 10 (1978)("...the universally
denied conspiracy of silence still exists"); Keeher, The Medical Conspiracy of Silence, 87 CASE
& CoM. 10 (1982); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 128-29 n.4 (1979) (dissenting opi-
nion by Justice Stevens comments on the continuing "conspiracy of silence"); Goldberg, supra
note 25, at 160 n. 48 (physicians are reluctant to report misconduct of their peers, as part
of the conspiracy of silence).
108. See Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d. at 346, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164. From the inception of
the doctrine of corporate hospital liability, the doctrine has been utilized and expanded by
the courts of several jurisdictions. Id. Elam cites several jurisdictions utilizing and expanding
the doctrine of corporate hospital liability. Id. at 346-347, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164-165. See generally,
Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate Hospital Liability, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 383,
384-385 (1980) (examining the significance and development of the doctrine of corporate hospital
liability).
109. See Southwick, supra note 97 at 443.
110. See infra notes 126-141 and accompanying text.
111. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d, at 340, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (court describes California
health care industry as truly "big business"); Relman, The New Medical Industrial Complex,
303 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 963 (1980); Note, supra, note 89 at 121. California has abolished
the doctrine giving hospitals charitable immunity. Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d
241 (1951). Most other states have also rejected charitable immunity for hospitals. Hanson
and Stromberg, Hospital Liability for Negligence, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4 (1969).
112. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
113. Gonzales v. Nork, Civ. No. 228566 (Super Ct. Sacramento County, Cal. Nov. 27,
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1. Gonzales v. Nork
Sixty lawsuits were filed against Dr. John Nork between the years
of 1965 and 1977. "' Although Dr. Nork was not a board certified"I5
orthopedic surgeon, he was allowed to perform orthopedic surgery
at Mercy Hospitals." 6 The evidence established that Dr. Nork negli-
gently or unnecessarily performed more than three dozen operations. 17
In addition, evidence showed falsifications of patient progress reports
and diagnostic findings." 8 Dr. Nork's accountant testified that the
doctor needed money to pay creditors." 9 Further, Dr. Nork admitted
in testimony to an addiction to drugs which affected his judgment. 20
The court noted that the hospital's peer review committee had not
reported the gross incompetence of Dr. Nork to the hospital
administration.'' Although the administration had no actual knowledge
of Dr. Nork's incompetence, the court found that hospitals should
be responsible for their quality assurance programs.' 22 Therefore, the
hospital had a responsibility to oversee the effectiveness of hospital
quality assurance programs. Commentators have noted that the Nork
case spearheaded the movement towards corporate hospital liability
in California. 2 3 In 1982, a California Appellate Court in Elam v.
College Park Hospital2 defined and applied the doctrine of corporate
hospital negligence for the first time on an appellate level. 2
1973), rev'd, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 31 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd, 20 Cal. 3d. 500, 573 P.2d
458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978).
114. Nork, Civ. No. 228566, Memorandum of Opinion, reprinted in Elami Questions, supra
note 98, at 810-811.
115. Board certification refers to a doctor who has been certified by a speciality board
for practice in orthopedics. (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
116. Elam Questions, supra note 98, at 810-811.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. "Quality control" or "quality assurance" refers to the process used to police physi-
cian incompetence in the hospital. This process includes credentials screening, which involves
reviewing applicants for staff privileges, and peer review, which involves the evaluation of the
staff physician's performance. JCAH Manual, supra note 46, at ix.
123. Note, supra note 89, at 116 n.7. See also Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hospital, 33 I11. 2d. 326, 211 NE. 2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (first case
in the U.S. to establish the direct duty of a hospital to furnish competent medical care or
be held liable for failure to do so, thereby establishing the doctrine of corporate hospital
negligence); Hanson & Stromberg, supra note 111, at 12-14; Goldberg, A Legal Perspective,
supra note 97, at 56.
124. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156.
125. Id. at 337, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 159. The California Supreme Court sets forth "stare
decisis" in California. An intermediate appellate decision is not binding in any other tribunal
across the state. Thus, courts may choose not to accept Elam. See Auto Equity Sales, Inc.
v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937
(stare decisis in California).
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2. Elam v. College Park Hospital
In 1982, Sophia Elam filed a medical malpractice action against
a podiatrist and College Park Hospital.' 2 6 The podiatrist was neither
an agent nor employee of the hospital, but was granted surgical
privileges by the governing board of the hospital.' 27 The podiatrist
was negligent in performing orthopedic surgery and, as a result, Sophia
Elam was injured. 21
The appellate court overturned the trial court's determination that
a hospital does not have a duty to protect patients from harm. '129
On the contrary, the court reasoned that the failure by the hospital
to ensure the competence of the medical staff through careful selec-
tion and review created an unreasonable risk of harm to hospital
patients. 3 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the chang-
ing role of the hospital in recent years.' The court observed that
the modern hospital has evolved from a charitable institution to a
corporate business. 32 The modern hospital is a multi-faceted health
care facility responsible for the quality of medical care and treatment
rendered to hospital clients.'33
Public policy concerns motivating the development of the doctrine
of corporate negligence were contrary to the interests asserted by the
California Hospital Association.' 34 The Hospital Association and
various medical lobbyists were concerned about the effect corporate
negligence would have upon the medical malpractice structure in
California.'35 The appellate court in Elam held that the duty of the
hospital to the public outweighed the adverse effect that corporate
hospital liability might have on the medical malpractice insurance struc-
ture in California.' 36 The court recognized that large numbers of plain-
tiffs would be able to establish a cause of action based on the new
duty.'37 The court, however, was not concerned by the increase in
cases as a result of the new cause of action.' 38 Public health care
126. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 335-366 n.1, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158 n.1.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 346-48, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164-66.
130. Id. at 341-4, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160-3.
131. Id. at 340, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
132. Id. at 344, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 346-7, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164-5.
135. Id. at 346-47, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65.
136. Id. at 346-347, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164-165.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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interests were held to outweigh the increase in potential liability as
a result of corporate hospital negligence. 39 The court in Elam deter-
mined that protection of the public would be ensured by holding the
corporate hospital liable for the negligent evaluation of peer review
proceedings.'4 0 In addition, the court intended to provide persons who
are injured because of medical staff incompetence with an "additional
avenue of relief"' 4 1 by establishing this new cause of action for cor-
porate hospital negligence.
THE IMPACT OF ELAM V. COLLEGE PARK HOSPITAL
UPON DISCOVERY OF PEER REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
The Elam case did not directly address whether a plaintiff in a
medical malpractice action, suing under the doctrine of corporate
hospital negligence, could obtain peer review records and proceedings
necessary to establish a cause of action. The records of medical staff
peer review committees are relevant and material to the issue of cor-
porate hospital negligence.' 42 The appellate court in Elam, however,
did provide guidance regarding the triable issues of fact in a cause
of action for corporate hospital negligence. '43
The court in Elam set forth four examples of triable issues. The
first example is whether a hospital should conduct an investigation
through the peer review committee upon notice of a doctor's poten-
tial negligence.' 4 4 A second issue is whether the committee conducted
periodic reviews of the doctor in a non-negligent manner.'45 Third,
assuming a review was made following notice, the issue focused upon
whether the review was performed in a non-negligent manner.' 46
Finally, if review was conducted in a careful and proper manner, would
the committee have recommended revocation or suspension of the doc-
tor's staff perquisites.
47
The court in Elam contemplated that a jury would have sufficient
evidence to determine whether peer review committees were negligently
monitored.' 4 The court indicated that the jury would decide if a peer
139. Id.
140. Id.; deVries, supra note 27, at 231.
141. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 347, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165; deVries, supra note 27, at
231, 237.
142. Comment, infra note 151, at 678-684; Nelson, supra note 68, at 305.
143. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 347-8, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165-166.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. deVries, supra note 27, at 231.
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review system had conducted reviews effectively.'4 9 In addition, the
manner in which the reviews were conducted and the reasonableness
of the conclusions are decided by a jury.'5 ° Therefore, since Elam
has created a cause of action for corporate hospital liability, a need
exists for discovery of peer review committee records and proceedings
by plaintiffs.' 5 '
The court in Elam established that a hospital has a duty to protect
the public from the incompetence of the hospital medical staff.'52 The
records and proceedings of hospital peer review committees are an
indispensable part of the plaintiff's attempt to prove corporate hospital
negligence.' 5 3 Current law, however, prevents discovery of these mat-
ters by patient litigants in medical malpractice actions.'5 4 Discovery
is denied under section 1157 of the California Evidence Code due
to policy interests envisioned by the legislature fifteen years before
corporate hospital negligence became a viable cause of action in
California.' 55 The incongruity between the cause of action for cor-
porate liability and the limits upon discovery in accordance with
Evidence Code section 1157 is an example of the development of law
when faced with competing policy considerations.' 5 6 Elam and sec-
tion 1157 each represent an attempt by a different branch of the legal
system to promote the same general goal, namely, the administration
of quality health care in the hospital setting.'57 The public has an
expectation of protection from medical staff incompetence.' 8 This
protection, as established by Elam, can be assured by imposition of
a duty on the part of the hospital to police its medical staff.'5 9 The
use of peer review as a policing device depends upon physicians report-
ing the malpractice of colleagues.' 60 Section 1157 allows for the con-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Comment, Anatomy of the Conflict Between Hospital Medical Staff Peer Review
Confidentiality and Medical Malpractice Plaintiff Recovery: A Case for Legislative Amend-
ment, 24 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 661, 677 (1984) (Elam questions the viability of CAL. EVWD.
CODE §1157); deVries, supra note 27, at 231 ("Elam evinces a clear indication for discovery
of peer review committee records and proceedings").
152. Elam, 132 Cal. App. at 347, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 165; see supra notes 126-141 and ac-
companying text.
153. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
154. CAL. EVID. CODE §1157. The statute contains an exception for plaintiff physicians who
are permitted to obtain records when seeking judicial review of proceedings leading to their
dismissal from hospital medical staffs. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
155. deVries, supra note 27, at 231, 237.
156. See Comment, supra note 151, at 684-685.
157. Id.
158. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 347, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
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fidentiality of peer review committee meetings to promote uninhibited
reporting of staff incompetence in an effort to upgrade the quality
of medical care in hospitals.' 6 1
The finding of the Elam court that a hospital is liable for the
negligence of physicians represents a judicial effort to encourage
hospitals to actively evaluate medical staff competence to ensure the
quality of medical treatment delivered within hospitals.'62 Section 1157,
however, represents a legislative effort to create an atmosphere of
confidentiality in which candid professional criticism can occur. 63 This
process of self-evaluation fulfills the supervisory responsibilities of the
hospital.' 64 Legislative amendment could heal the apparent incom-
patibility between section 1157 and the recent decisions creating cor-
porate hospital liability.' 65
Several confidentiality privileges in California as well as in a number
of other states are theoretically similar to the peer review privilege. 66
Confidentiality privileges other than the peer review privilege, however,
are qualified rather than absolute.' 67 A review of confidentiality
privileges both in California and in other states provides support for
the adoption of a qualified privilege for peer review proceedings.' 68
The adoption of a qualified privilege containing certain allowances
for discovery, while assuring confidentiality of peer review activities,
would best serve the ultimate interests of the state in improving the
quality of medical care.' 69
DEVELOPMENT OF PRMLEGES
Privileges that protect, to varying degrees, the confidential com-
munications between doctor and patient, employer and employee, priest
and penitent, therapist and patient, and attorney and client are the
result of a delicate balancing between competing public interests.' 70
161. Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320; see supra notes 71-95 and
accompanying text.
162. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 347, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165. The judicial effort was to
expand the common law to duty of liability. The hospital owes a duty directly to the patient.
Id. at 340-341, 160-161.
163. Comment, supra note 151, at 677-78.
164. Id.
165. Id. see infra notes 287-290 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 170-286 and accompanying text.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See infra notes 181-225 and accompanying text.
170. J. vicmoRE, supra note 12, at §2285 (McNaughten Rev. 1961).
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With the exception of the clergyman-penitent privilege,' 7 ' these
privileges are subject to statutory exceptions in which public safety
interests, judicial requirements, or other compelling societal interests
are considered to outweigh the need for confidentiality.' Even the
attorney-client privilege, perhaps the oldest and most sedulously
fostered privilege, is subject to several exceptions.' 73
Four conditions have been established for a communication to merit
a privileged status: 7 ' (1) the communication must originate in con-
fidence; (2) confidentiality must be essential to satisfactory maintenance
of the parties' relationship; (3) the relationship must be one the com-
munity sedulously fosters; and (4) the injury to the relationship that
would result from disclosure of the communication must outweigh
the benefits of the disclosure for purposes of litigation.'
In California, limits are placed upon confidentiality privileges.'"
The principle that the public "has a right to every man's evidence"
has usually outweighed countervailing interests.' Therefore, most
privileges are qualified rather than absolute.' 78 The privilege that ex-
pressly protects confidential communications between peer review com-
mittee members is relatively new in most states. ' Originally, the only
legal protection of confidentiality possessed by physicians existed under
171. CAL. EVID. CODE §§1030-34; J. WIGMORE, supra note 12 at §2394-96.
172. Comment, Untangling Tarasoff. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
29 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 194 (1977). The fact that the legislature expressly allows disclosure in
certain circumstances indicates that interests other than confidentiality can be paramount. Id;
see also CAL. Evrw. CODE §1024.
173. See CAL. Evm. CODE §956 (crime or fraud), CAL. Evm. CODE §857 (parties claiming
through deceased client); CAL. Evi. CODE §958 (breach of duty arising out of lawyer-client
relationship); CAL. Evm. CODE §§959-61 (deceased client); CAL. EviM. CODE §962 (joint clients).
174. J. WIOMORE, supra note 12, at §2285.
175. Id.
176. See Hallendorf v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 553, 558-59, 149 Cal. Rptr. 564,
567 (Kane, J. dissenting). During 1952 the following general rules were set forth by the court
to determine the proper exercise of discretion in discovery cases:
To constitute a proper exercise of discretion, the factual determination of the trial
court should clearly and unequivocally be based upon the following legal concepts:
The legislative purpose is to give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the
truth and checking and preventing perjury; provide an effective means of detecting
and exposing false, fraudulent and sham claims and defenses; make available in a
simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved
except with great difficulty; expedite litigation; simplify and narrow the issues; and
expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial are not to be subverted under the
guise of the exercise of discretion.
Id.
177. J. VIGMORE, supra note 12, at §2285.
178. Id.
179. Franko v. District Court in & for City & Cty. of Denver, 641 P.2d 922, 925 (peer
review statutes enacted with increasing frequency in the last few years).
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the doctor-patient privilege.8 0 Today, several states by statute or com-
mon law recognize some form of a peer review privilege.' 8' In Califor-
nia, the peer-review privilege is absolute.' The absolute privilege is
effective in protecting hospital committee proceedings and reports from
discovery. 183 This protection, however, has been a hindrance to public
access to certain information."' This hindrance has been especially
critical in litigation in which the privilege bars the most crucial evidence
in a corporate negligence case.'85 A study of other confidentiality
statutes supports the application of a qualified privilege to peer review
proceedings. 8 6 The California legislature for example, has recogniz-
ed that confidentiality is vitally important to the successful operation
of psychotherapy. 8 7 The courts, however, have held the privilege is
not absolute.'88 An analogy of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
to the peer review privilege demonstrates the need for a qualified
privilege in peer review.
A. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
The significance of confidentiality in the psychotherapist-patient
relationship has been recognized by both the California legislature
and judiciary.' 89 The psychotherapist-patient privilege, however, is not
absolute and is withdrawn in the presence of compelling public
interests.' 90 Several California courts have disallowed the use of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.' 9 ' The privilege is withheld in
deference to the compelling need of the state to ascertain the truth, 92
180. J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, at §2285.
181. Goldberg, supra note 25, at 153-54.
182. See supra notes 43-95 and accompanying text.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 142-165 and accompanying text; see infra notes 287-304 and accompa-
nying text.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See infra notes 189-233 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 190-281 and accompanying text; see also, T. GuTmsn & P. APPELBAUM,
CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 11 (1982) (essence of treatment rests on
inviolate confidentiality); R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER, & J. RurBiN, READING IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY
154 (1968); see infra notes 190-233 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 190-233 and accompanying text.
190. CAL. Evn. CODE §§1010-1028.
191. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 438-439, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 845, 467 P.2d. 557, 572
(1970); Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 864, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 702, 574 P.2d 766,
782 (1978); Hallendorf v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 553, 558-560, 149 Cal.Rptr. 564,
567-568 (1978); Jones v. Superior Court, 1-19 Cal. App_3d 534, 548, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 157
(1981).
192. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
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the interest of the state in detecting fraud,' 93 and the interest of the
state in protecting the public from bodily harm. 9
1. California State Interest In Ascertaining Truth For Just
Resolution of Legal Claims
In 1970, the California Supreme Court in In re Lifschutz, rejected
an absolute privilege of confidentiality for communications between
a patient and psychotherapist.' 95 Generally, patients have the privilege
to refuse disclosure of confidential communications between the pa-
tient and the psychotherapist. 9 6 California Evidence Code section 1016,
however, establishes an exception to the general rule.'9 7 The patient
litigant exception provides that communications relevant to the pa-
tient's medical condition and disclosed by the patient, are discoverable
when the plaintiff institutes the action. 98 The California Supreme Court
in Britt v. Superior Court concluded that the scope of inquiry into
confidential communications depends upon the nature of the injuries
the patient litigant has brought before the court.' 99 Application of
the privilege requires balancing of the litigants' rights with competing
state interests.200 If state interests are not compelling, the confiden-
tial communications must be disclosed.2"' The California Supreme
Court has determined that the interest of the state in facilitating the
discovery of truth in connection with legal proceedings is sufficient
to compel disclosure of confidential material.2"2 Another example of
an interest that California courts have held to outweigh the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is the compelling interest of the state
in detecting and prosecuting suspected fraud.2"'
2. State Interest in Detecting and Prosecuting Fraud
In McKirdy v. Superior Court for the City and County of San Fran-
cisco, defendant McKirdy fraudulently billed the Medi-Cal Program
193. See infra notes 205-222 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 223-233 and accompanying text.
195. In Re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 438, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 836, 467 P.2d at 564-573.
196. Britt, 20 Cal. 3d at 862-863, 574 P.2d at 778, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 706-707.
197. CAL. EvrD. CODE §1016.
198. Britt, 20 Cal. 3d at 863-864, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 707-708, 574 P.2d. at 777-779.
199. Id. at 864, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 707-708, 574 P.2d at 766.
200. Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 432-433, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839-840, 467 P.2d at 564-569.
201. Id. at 423, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 833-834, 467 P.2d at 564-567.
202. Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 550, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 158 (1981);
Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 681, 156 Cal. Rptr.
55, 62 (1979); Britt, 20 Cal. 3d at 857, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 703, 574 P.2d at 773-777; Valley
Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 657, 542 P.2d 977, 980, 125 Cal. Rptr.
553, 558 (1975).
203. See infra notes 204-221 and accompanying text.
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for psychotherapy treatment totalling over $76,000.204 Files labeled
with the names of forty-nine patients were seized by the Medi-Cal
Fraud Unit Investigators.205 The files contained information regarding
services actually rendered by the psychiatrist and additional evidence
that enabled the Fraud Unit to interview other victims. 2 6 The court
determined that compelling disclosure did not violate the patients' con-
stitutional privacy interests."0 7 In addition, the court found that the
patients' privacy interests were outweighed by the need of the state
to prosecute suspected fraud. 28 The court reasoned that the patients
themselves, "as short-changed recipients of health care" were the
victims. 20 9 Therefore, pretrial discovery of the files was permitted. 210
The compelling state interest in detecting fraud also exists in the
hospital setting.21' Unnecessary surgery or treatment is essentially fraud
of services.212 For example, if a physician tells a patient that a specified
treatment is essential when in actuality the treatment is neither nec-
cessary nor beneficial, the physician may be legally liable for fraud.2 '
The fraud perpetrated in McKirdy is analogous to the fraud of
services by a physician who renders unnecessary treatment. 2 4 A situa-
tion could arise in which a hospital knew that a physician was per-
forming unnecessary surgery and the peer review committee had not
taken disciplinary measures to control the fraudulent conduct. 2 ' Peer
204. McKirdy v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. App. 3d 12, 22, 188 Cal. Rptr. 143, 149-150 (1982).
205. See id. at 17, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
206. Id. at 16, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
207. See id. at 23, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 23, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
210. Id. at 28, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
211. L. HAROLDS & M. BLOCK, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - THE ATLA SEMINAR 443; Com-
ment, Unnecessary Surgery: Doctor and Hospital Liability, 61 GEo. L.J. 807, 808-814
(1973) (exploration of physician and hospital liability for unnecessary surgery); See infra notes
212-221 and accompanying text.
212. HRoLDs & BLOCK, supra note 211 at 443.
213. Id.
214. See McKirdy, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 23, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 150. The records of services
McKirdy performed for each of his patients supplemented the information the investigators
received from other patients about the fraud. Id. Similarly, the peer review records of the
hospital would disclose evidence of unnecessary surgery.
215. See e.g., Gonzales v. Nork, Civ. No. 228566 (Super Ct. Sacramento County, Cal.,
Nov. 27, 1973) rev'd, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 31 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd and remanded,
20 Cal. 3d. 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978) (In Nork the physician had commit-
ted fraud and malpractice); The controversy that surrounds open bypass surgery is the result
of unnecessary treatment by physicians. The Sacramento Bee, September 16, 1985, at 1, col.
1. An estimated 190,000 open-heart bypass surgeries were performed in 1983, and studies in-
dicate that between one-third and four-fifths of these procedures were performed too soon
or were inappropriate for patients who could have been treated more effectively with drugs.
Id. col. 1, at 1. Dr. Eugene Passamani, head cardiologist at the National Heart, Lung, and
Blood Institute sponsored the study. Id. Stanford Heart transplant surgeon Norman Shumway
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review records are as relevant to investigation of the fraud as were
the files in McKirdy.216 The situations are parallel. Yet, unlike records
of peer review proceedings, files of the defendant psychiatrist are
discoverable. 21 7
As demonstrated, the state has a compelling interest in ascertain-
ing the truth and achieving the just resolution of legal claims.2"' In
addition, the state has a compelling interest in investigating and detect-
ing fraud by physicians." 9 The psychotherapist-patient privilege is
withheld when necessary to obtain these goals.220 Therefore, the peer
review privilege should not be absolute if discovery is necessary to
facilitate the ascertainment of truth and achieve just resolution of
legal claims. 22'
3. The State Interest In Protecting the Public From Harm
In the landmark case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California, the California Supreme Court identified a compelling state
interest in protecting the public from foreseeable risks of harm.222
The court allowed an exception to the common law rule that a per-
son has no duty to warn persons who might foreseeably be endangered
by the conduct of others.223 The Tarasoff exception occurs in two
types of relationships. The first exception occurs when the defendant
stands in a special relationship to a person whose conduct needs to
believes "economic self-interest will compel surgeons to continue doing the bypass procedure:
they can't [stop]. They have these big house payments, and they're driving Ferraris. They'll
be operating on each other soon I'm afraid." Id. col. 1, at A 10 ; see supra notes 113-125
and accompanying text.
216. See McKirdy, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 23, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 150-151 (specific state need
to obtain files that may contain contemporaneous records of fraudulent services).
217. Id.
218. Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 423, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 833-834, 467 P.2d at 564-573; see supra
notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
219. McKirdy, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 21-24, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 148-51; see supra notes 204-221
and accompanying text.
220. Id.
221. See infra notes 287-304 and accompanying text.
222. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 13 Cal. 3d. 177, 186, 529 P.2d
553, 561-562, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 135 (1974) modified on rehearing, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d
334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
223. CAL. EvD. CODE §1024 (exception: patient dangerous to himself or others); see, HAIGHT
& COrCHrT, CALIFORNIA COURTROOM EVIDENCE, supra note 12, at 297; see also, Ayers Jr.
& Holbrook, Law, Psychotherapy, and the Duty to Warn: a Tragic Trilogy; in HA.Ti REcoRDs
AND CONFIDENTIALITY (R. Aldrich ed. 1977) (annotated bibliography with abstracts prepared
for the National Commission on Confidentiality of Health Records; supporting the imposition
of a duty to warn on psychotherapists, right of the public to be protected such as the more
important social interest).
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be controlled.224 The second exception occurs when the defendant has
a relationship with the foreseeable victim of the conduct. 25 Specifically,
the Supreme Court determined that the duty of the psychotherapist
to protect society from certain individuals who pose a threat to public
safety outweighs the resulting breach of confidence between doctor
and patient.226 The court also recognized the duty of the hospital to
exercise reasonable care to protect persons that may be harmed by
a patient within hospital facilities.227
The duty of a corporate hospital is analogous to that of a
psychotherapist. 228 Hospitals as well as psychotherapists have an af-
firmative duty to protect the public from persons who foreseeably
may pose a threat to bodily safety.229 Incompetent physicians pose
a threat of bodily harm to patients.23 A hospital has an affirmative
duty, as established by Elam, to protect the public from the negligence
and danger posed by incompetent physicians.23" ' Justice Tobriner in
Tarasoff announced that the confidentiality of "the protective privilege
ends where the public peril begins. ' 23 2 Thus, the protective privilege
of section 1157 should end when public safety is threatened.
B. Privilege For Official Information
The privilege to withhold official information of the government
is similar to the peer review privilege.233 In California, the govern-
ment generally claims privilege under specific nondisclosure statutes
or under the general statute giving the judge discretion to bar disclosure
on the facts of a particular case. 234 The most important statute regard-
ing the privilege for official information in California is section 1040
224. Tarasoff, 13 Cal. 3d at 186-187, 529 P.2d at 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 129. See Slovenko,
Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 375, 391 (1975); Stone, The Tarasoff
Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REv. 358, 370"(1976);
Comment, Tarasoff and the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn, 12 SAt DIEGO L. REv. 932, 940
(1974) (all discussing duties imposed by Tarasofj).
225. Tarasoff, 13 Cal. 3d at 186-187, 529 P.2d at 561-562, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
226. Id. at 192-193. 529 P.2d at 557; 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135-136.
227. Id. at 187-188, 529 P. 2d at 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 134-135. See Vistica v. Presbyterian
Hospital, 67 Cal. 2d 465, 468, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580, 432 P.2d 193, 195-197 (1967).
228. See infra notes 229-234 and accompanying text.
229. Vistica, 67 Cal. 2d at 469, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 580, 432 P.2d. at 195-197.
230. See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
231. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 332-48, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 156-65; see supra notes 126-141
and accompanying text.
232. Tarasoff, 13 Cal. 3d at 177, at 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
233. See infra notes 234-259 and accompanying text.
234. See CAL. EvID. CODE §1040; CAL. PENAL CODE §§290, 1203.10 (specific nondisclosure
statute); Comment, Governmental Privileges: Roadblock to Effective Discovery, 7 U.S.F.L.
REv. 282, 283 (1973).
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of the Evidence Code.2 35 This section establishes a governmental
privilege against disclosure of official information when disclosure is
against the public interest.2 36 The statute defines "official informa-
tion" as information acquired in confidence by an employee in the
course of duty and not officially disclosed.237
Unlike the peer review privilege, California Evidence Code section
1040(b)(2) provides a conditional privilege for official information.2 31
The judge has the discretion to decide whether or not the official
information is privileged from discovery. 239 The decision whether in-
formation should be made public or remain confidential requires a
balancing of the relative interests of the parties. 40 If confidentiality
is necessary to protect legitimate governmental functions that would
be impaired by disclosure, discovery is denied.2 ' This balancing pro-
cess is determined on a case by case basis by the trial judge.242
In Environmental Protection Services v. Mink, "3 the United States
Supreme Court distilled a flexible rule concerning the privilege of ex-
ecutive agencies to withhold official information from the public.2 44
The holding of the Court in Mink required the disclosure of purely
factual, investigative matters.24 5 Personal opinions drawn from the
facts, however, could not be exposed. 246 Furthermore, the Court would
not permit the withholding of factual material otherwise available dur-
ing discovery merely because the facts were placed in a memorandum
with the opinions of the executives. 247 The Court concluded that there
should be practical, common sense application of discovery rules.24 8
235. Id. at 285. See Comment, Access to Government Information in California, 54 CAL.
L. REV. 1650, 1665 (1966) (confidentiality of governmental records).
236. CAL. Evrm. CODE §1040(b); see Comment, Public Inspection of State and Municipal
Executive Documents: Everybody, Practically Everything, Anytime, Except, 45 FORDaAm L.
REV. 1105, 1105-1143 (1977) (assessment of statutory right to public inspection of information
and data in 48 states noting the trend toward liberalization in public inspection).
237. CAL. EvID. CODE §1040(a).
238. Id. §1040(b)(2).
239. See CAL. EVID. CODE §1040 (privilege exists only if the interest in maintaining the
secrecy of the information outweighs the interest in seeing that justice is done); see also People
v. Glen Arms Estate, Inc., 230 Cal. App. 2d 841, 846 n. 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305 n.1 (1964);
J. WIoMoRE, supra note 12, at 812 n.6. (necessary for the judge to examine the information
claimed to be privileged in order to balance competing considerations intelligently).
240. See CAL. EVID. CODE §1040(b)(2).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 410 U.S. 73 (1982).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 87-89.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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Specifically, the Court concluded that a balancing process must be
utilized to focus upon the relative interests of the parties in relation
to materials sought. 249
In Shepard v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court enun-
ciated guidelines for trial court balancing to determine whether
disclosure would be against the public interest. 2 0 The court stated:
Implicit in each assessment is a consideration of consequences
ie... the consequences to the litigant of non-disclosure, and the con-
sequences to the public of disclosure. The consideration of conse-
quences to the litigant will involve matters including the importance
of the material sought to the fair presentation of the litigant's case,
the availability of the material to the litigant by other means, and
the effectiveness and relative difficulty of such other means.2"
This balancing process, however, has been described as requiring
an "exquisite" weighing process by the trial judge. 252 Courts and com-
mentators have noted that as considerations justifying confidentiality
become less convincing, the party seeking discovery will have an easier
burden to meet. 253 If the reasons for maintaining confidentiality do
not apply in a given situation, or apply only to an insignificant degree,
249. Id. See Moore-McCormack Lines Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore, 508 F.2d 945,
948 (4th Cir. 1974) (U.S. Supreme Court discussion of "balancing" process).
250. Shepard v. Superior Court; 17 Cal. 3d. 107, 126, 130 Cal. Rptr. 257, 267-269, 550
P. 2d. 161, 171-172 (1976).
251. Id. See American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Deukmejian, 32 Cal. 3d 440,
440-447, 651 P.2d 822, 829-831, 186 Cal. Rptr. 235-37 (1982). The standard used in Shepard
is similar in context to other state standards. See also Cashen v. Spann, 77 N.J. 138, 142
(1978) ("substantial showing of need" for informer's name required in civil action); McClain
v. College Park Hospital, 492 A.2d 991, 997 (1985) (New Jersey Supreme Court recognized
that the executive privilege is similar conceptually to hospital committee proceedings). See also
Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal Status, I Am. J.L. & MED.
245, 274-75 (1975) (discussion of states that have enacted statutes to protect hospital committee
reports).
252. Mink, 410 U.S. at 80 (Senate committee explained "it is not an easy task to balance
opposing interests, but it is not an impossible one either"). See also Cronin v. Strayer, 467
N.E.2d 143, 149 (1984) (trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing interests
of the parties affected by discovery). Bredice v. Doctors Hospital Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C.
1970) (hospital staff reports not subject to discovery without showing "exceptional necessity");
Upjohn v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("an uncertain privilege or one which purports to
be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege
at all.").
253. See H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953) (statutory freedom of informa-
tion laws discussed, with author noting that considerations of confidentiality are becoming less
relevant with the onslaught of consumer protection laws); Comment, supra note 6, at 1097
(case by case balancing test approach); see also Comment, Government Information and the
Rights of Citizens, 73 MICHIGAN L.R. 971 (1975). The majority of states exempt inter-agency
memoranda and correspondence. Id. at 1172-1174. "Specific statutory exemptions are legislative
attempts to pre-determine the results of the balancing test on a categorical basis," Id. at 1176.
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the party seeking disclosure should not be required to demonstrate
a compelling need. 254
The same standard should apply in a corporate hospital negligence
case as in a case concerning interagency government memoranda. The
policy justifications for keeping interagency files confidential include
the theory that persons will be inhibited from free discussion if files
are not protected.255 The policy considerations in favor of enactment
of Evidence Code section 1157 included encouraging frankness, can-
dor, and objectivity in staff committee investigations. 256 The policies
are similar, yet the executive privilege is not absolute. 257 Thus, peer
review records and proceedings should not be absolute. A qualified
privilege applied by the trial judge on a case by case basis is the best
means to assure a proper administration of justice. 58
C. Trade Secret Privilege
The trade secret privilege embodied in Evidence Code section 1060
was enacted by the California Legislature in 1965.259 The privilege
provides protection for secret information essential to the continued
operation of a business or industry.260 The trade secret privilege
prevents a witness from testifying if testimony will injure an other-
wise profitable business.26' Disclosure of matters protected by the
privilege may be necessary, however, to reveal unfair competition,
fraud, or the improper use of dangerous materials.262 Recognizing the
trade secret privilege in these instances would allow the wrongdoer
to shield unlawful conduct from legal scrutiny. 263 Commentators
recognize the dangers of application of the trade secret privilege when
used to conceal fraud or when use of the privilege would result in
injustice.2 64 Furthermore, commentators recognize that copyright and
patent laws already provide adequate protection for matters sometimes
classifed as trade secrets.265
254. Shepard, 17 Cal. 3d at 127, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 267-269, 550 P.2d at 171-172.
255. Id; see supra notes 233-254 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
257. Id.
258. See infra notes 285-302 and accompanying text.
259. CAL. EVID. CODE §1060 (trade secret privilege); see also J. WIoOR, supra note 12,
at §2212 (trade secret privilege generally).
260. CAL. EVID. CODE §1060.
261. Id.
262. See CAL. EVID. CODE §1060; see also CAL. EvD. CODE §915 (disclosure of secret to
court); CAL. PENAL CODE §653 (overhearing and recording confidential communication).
263. See, CAL. EVID. CODE §1060.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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The standards for application of the trade secret privilege should
be used for the peer review privilege.26 6 The basis for applying trade
secret privilege standards to the peer review privilege is twofold. First,
just as existing patent and copyright laws provide some protection
for trade secrets, the immunity statutes adequately protect physicians
acting within the scope of hospital committee proceedings.2 67 If the
application of the peer review privilege would conceal fraud, or
dangerous practices, the privilege should not be used.
Secondly, operation of the modern hospital is similar to a business
corporation.2 68 Essential to continued operation of hospital business
is the hospital's reputation. 26 A reputable hospital will draw more
clients and thereby increase profits.27 This reputation is integral to
the "product" of the hospital, namely, providing quality medical
services." ' Disclosure of unfavorable committee report findings
diminshes the hospital's reputation.272 The disclosure would affect
profits, since patients would be likely to obtain services elsewhere.
Similarly, the disclosure of trade secrets by a business would diminish
the unique qualities of a particular business. 2" Disclosure would give
other businesses access to the trade secrets. 274 Thus disclosure might
also cause profits of the business to decrease. 27 Unlike the trade secret
privilege, however, the privilege protecting hospital committee secrets
is not subject to discovery by patient litigants under any
circumstances. 276
A situation could arise in which a hospital knew that a doctor was
incompetent or impaired and did not prevent the doctor from perform-
ing negligent surgeries.277 If the surgeon's performance fell below a
266. See infra notes 267-284 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 27 and accompanying text.
268. See Sacramento Bee, September 16, 1985, at 10, col. 1. In a statement from Dr. Hultgren
he noted, "[wle're entering an era where medicine is big money; its big business. Private prac-
titioners are not in corporations. If you don't make money, you're out. If you're a big
moneymaker, you're an asset to the corporation." Id.
269. Interview with Francis N. Fullam, Assistant Executive Director, West Jersey Health
System Eastern Division, Cherry Hill, New Jersey (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal).
270. Id; see infra note 274 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g. Gonzales v. Nork, Civ. No. 228566 (Super Ct. Sacramento County, Cal.,
Nov. 27, 1973) rev'd, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 31 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd and remanded,
20 Cal. 3d. 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978).
273. See Wear, A Balanced Approach to Employer-Employee Trade Secret Disputes in Califor-
nia 31 HAs nGs L.J. 671, 693-95 (1980) (balancing test to determine disclosure of trade secrets).
274. Id. at 673-75.
275. Id.
276. See supra notes 260-272 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 113-125, 210-215 and accompanying text.
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reasonable standard of care the patient litigant would have a cause
of action in corporate hospital negligence. The patient litigant, however,
could not recover, because the conduct constituting negligence is ab-
solutely privileged from discovery.278 The trade secret privilege in
California will not be applied to conceal fraud or otherwise work
injustice. 7 9 This standard should apply to the privilege protecting
hospital committee meetings from discovery. Whether the hospital is
protecting the memoranda of hospital peer review committees to con-
ceal the wrongs committed by staff members should be monitored
by the trial court.28 To effectuate this monitoring, the court in a
malpractice action could hold an in camera inspection2"' to ascertain
the result of medical investigative committees. After balancing the
Shepard factors,282 the judge could determine if application of the
privilege was necessary to the proper administration of justice.
In the majority of states, the privilege of self-critical analysis is
not absolute.2"3 The privilege is generally applied on a case by case
basis.28 ' Statutes and decisions have indicated the privilege can be over-
come by a showing of exceptional need by the party seeking
discovery.285 The following proposed statute achieves a balanced result.
PROPOSAL: QUALIFIED PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
The California Legislature should amend Evidence Code section 1157
to provide for a qualified instead of an absolute privilege. The enact-
ment of a statutory amendment to section 1157 would be the most
effective means of ensuring the proper administration of justice. Plain-
tiff access to peer review committee records will serve the purpose
of the Legislature of improving health care in California.
Use of Committee Reports, Records or Statements in Judicial
and Administrative Proceedings
(a) Absent a showing of extraordinary necessity, the minutes,
analysis, preliminary and final findings and reports of a medical utiliza-
278. See supra notes 71-95, 126-141 and acompanying text.
279. See supra notes 260-286 and accompanying text.
280. See infra notes 287-303 and accompanying text.
281. Saddleback Community Hospital v. Superior Court, 158 Cal.App.3d 206, 209, 204
Cal.Rptr. 598, 600.
282. See supra notes 234-259 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 9-32 and accompanying text.
284. Comment, supra note 6, at 1093.
285. See supra notes 287-290 and accompanying text.
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tion review committee, peer review committee, medical staff commit-
tee, tissue review committee, or any other medical competence review
committee shall not be subject to discovery or admissible into evidence
in any civil or administrative proceeding.
(b) This qualified privilege does not extend to primary health
records or to any oral or written statements submitted to or presented
before a medical utilization committee, medical staff committee, or
tissue review committee.
(c) This section shall not affect the right of any individual employed
by, formerly employed by, or formerly associated with a hospital or
extended care facility within California to admit into evidence or sub-
ject to discovery the minutes and reports of a medical utilization review
committee, peer review committee, medical staff committee or tissue
review committee, for the limited purpose of adjudicating the pro-
priety of an adverse action by such institution affecting the employ-
ment or association of such person.286
(d) This self-critical analysis privilege is construed to protect the
evaluative but not the factual portions of self-analyses."'?
(e) Definitions
1. Extraordinary Necessity
Extraordinary necessity288 refers to exceptional rather than ordinary
factual situations. This provision refers to the ability of a judge to
withdraw the privilege if necessary for the proper administration of
justice.
286. See D.C. CODE ANN. §32-505 (1981) (allows the discovery of peer review upon a showing
of extraordinary need); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. §8-53 (1981) (the N.C. legislature intended to
make a provision to avoid injustice and suppression of truth by allowing the trial judge discre-
tion to compel disclosure).
287. See Comment, supra note 6, at 1093 (interpreting extraordinary need test). This stan-
dard was used in a recent New Jersey Supreme Court medical malpractice case. McClain v
College Park Hospital, 492 A.2d 991, 992-996 (1985). Plaintiff was a patient at defendant Col-
lege Hospital. While undergoing a routine "D&C" (dilation and curettage) her endotracheal
tube came out while in recovery. She quickly underwent cardiac and respiratory arrest, lapsed
into a coma and died the same day. The death of the plaintiff coincided with several other
deaths occurring in the Ob-Gyn unit of the defendant hospital. Following those deaths, in-
vestigations were initiated by the State Board of Medical Examiners (Board). The investigation
was conducted by the executive committee of the Board and reports of the committee's evalua-
tions and recommendations were filed. The plaintiff contended that the records were relevant
to the civil litigation and that the information was otherwise unavailable to her from other
sources. The Board found no cause of action against those who were responsible for the deaths
of plaintiff and others. The Supreme COurt, however, noted that this constituted "gross malprac-
tice, gross negligence and gross incompetence which is much more than is required of plaintiffs
in proving a deviation from accepted medical standards." Consequently, the court fashioned
standards which could be applied by a trial court to determine whether discovery would be
permitted. Id.
288. See supra notes 287 and accompanying text.
1986 / Peer Review Privilege
2. Primary Health Records
Primary health records are defined as information, documents or
records otherwise available from original sources. Primary health
records are not to be construed as immune from discovery in any
civil action merely due to presentation during proceedings of a review
committee. A person who testifies before such a committee or who
is a member of the committee is not prevented from testifying as
to factual matters within the witnesses knowledge, but the witness
cannot be asked about opinions formed as a result of the committee
hearings.
By requiring that the peer review privilege be qualified rather than
absolute, the foregoing proposal ensures that existing professional and
legal sanctions will serve as effective deterrents of medical in-
competence. Application of the privilege would avoid injustice and
suppression of truth by allowing a trial judge to compel disclosure.
STANDARD GOVERNING DIscLosuRE OF CONMIDENTIAL INFORMATION
The appropriate trial court standard for governing the disclosure
of confidential investigative records in hospitals is a showing of par-
ticularized need that outweighs the public interest in confidentiality.2 19
The trial court may consider certain factors in balancing the litigant's
personal interests against the confidentiality claims of the hospital.
These factors are similar to the balancing factors used by the California
Supreme Court in Shepard v. Superior Court..29 The balancing fac-
tors include: (1) the extent to which the information may be available
from other sources; (2) the degree of harm that the litigant will suf-
fer from the unavailability of the records and proceedings; and (3)
the possible prejudice to the committees in permitting discovery. Trial
courts should be cognizant of the three balancing factors when deter-
mining whether peer review proceedings and records may be subject
to discovery. Hence, the three balancing criteria must be examined
in the context of a civil proceeding based upon corporate hospital
negligence.
First, trial courts should be concerned about the ability of the plain-
tiff to obtain the information to establish corporate negligence from
other sources. 9 ' Examples of other sources of information that are
289. See Shepard, 17 Cal. 3d at 126-27, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 267-68, 550 P.2d at 171-72 (same
standard used for discovery under 1040(b)(2).
290. Id.; see supra notes 279-287 and accompanying text.
291. Shepard, 17 Cal. 3d. at 126, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 268, 550 P.2d at 172.
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freely discoverable include the administrative files of the hospital, 292
surgical privilege cards, 293 staff membership re-application documents,294
and the patient's medical record.2 95 As an alternative, courthouse
records could be consulted for information regarding how frequently
a hospital has been sued. 296 The Board of Medical Quality Assurance
should also be contacted to determine whether any prior investiga-
tions of the hospital or the physician have been conducted.297 If the
plaintiff is able to obtain information regarding negligence from other
sources, the judge should strictly apply the privilege limiting discovery.
Second, courts should consider the degree of harm that the litigant
will suffer from the unavailability of the committee records. An
egregious example of harm would be the litigant's inability to establish
a cause of action because the plaintiff cannot discover the facts
necessary for a proper pleading of the case. The court may focus
on how pivotal the information is in establishing the cause of action.299
Another example would be the expense or undue hardship of obtain-
ing the information from other sources. If a plaintiff can discover
information from other sources without undue hardship and expense,
a strict privilege should be upheld.
Finally, consideration must also be given to the possible prejudice
to the function of peer review proceedings if the privilege is withdrawn.
Discovery of peer review committee reports and proceedings may have
a chilling effect upon frankness or thoroughness in self-evaluation. 299
In addition, courts should be aware that physicians may not come
foward with information of a colleague's negligence for fear of retribu-
tion by either the hospital or the negligent physician.3"' However, courts
should also be aware that most physicians would take the steps
necessary to protect the long-term reputation of their profession and
their hospitals, and would bring forward relevant information.30 ' In
292. See Nelson, supra note 68, at 306 (describing the alternative methods to discover evidence
to establish corporate hospital negligence).
293. Id. at 307.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 309.
297. Id.
298. United Farm Workers v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 391, 395 - Cal.
Rptr. - (1985). Even the first amendment right of freedom of association is not absolute.
IW. at 395. Associational activities may be inquired into in deference to a compelling state
interest of truth in litigation. Disclosures may be compelled only when that disclosure is direct-
ly related to the claim of the plaintiff. Id.
299. Matchett, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 322 (1984); see supra notes 71-95
and accompanying text.
300. Comment, supra note 6, at 1092-93.
301. Jenkins v. Delon Wu , 468 N.E. 2d 1162 (1984) (plaintiff in malpractice case contend-
ed that even without the peer review privilege physicians would take steps necessary to protect
the long-term reputation of their profession and their hospital).
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fact, the Code of Ethics for the medical profession requires physi-
cians to report unethical or illegal conduct."' Thus, recognition of
a peer review committee privilege based on protection of confiden-
tiality should occur on a case by case basis weighing the three Shepard
factors.
CONCLUSION
Medicine is an essential service in modern society. While the vast
majority of health professionals are competent, some incompetent
physicians pose a threat of physical harm to the public. A basic tenet
of western society is that each person is responsible for his or her
wrongs. If an individual injures someone through negligence, the in-
dividual must accept the consequences. This tenet applies to all
businesses and occupations. One of the primary bases of liability in
our system of justice is based upon fault.
Consistent with the axiom that each person is responsible for his
or her wrongs is the maxim that the law abhors forfeiture of a remedy.
The remedy for negligent evaluation of peer review committee pro-
ceedings is an action for corporate hospital negligence. California
Evidence Code section 1157, without amendment, cripples the check
on negligent practitioners by prohibiting disclosure of information
necessary for establishment of corporate hospital liability. This com-
ment has recognized the state interest in protecting confidential records
and proceedings of hospital peer review committees. The importance
of the state interest in policing physician incompetency is evidenced
by Elam v College Park Hospital. These competing interests compel
a case by case balancing by trial judges. A qualified privilege should
be adopted by the California Legislature that would allow access by
litigants to committee records when necessary to support a claim. The
adoption of a qualified privilege will serve the purpose of improving
the quality of medical care in California hospitals.
Judith Ann Schneider
302. See American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics, reprinted in S. REISER,
A. DYCK & W. CURRON, ETHICS IN MEDICINE 30-38 (1977).
The medical profession should safeguard the public and itself against physicians defi-
cient in moral character or professional competence. Physicians should observe all
laws, uphold the dignity and honor of the profession and accept its self-imposed
disciplines. They should expose, without hesitation, illegal or unethical conduct of
fellow members of the profession.
Id.
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